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In civil cases involving more than one defendant, the defendants 
typically work together to coordinate their defense strategy.! This in-
volvement could be most easily accomplished ifthe multiple defendants 
were represented by one attorney.2 Often this type of representation is 
not possible, however, because conflicts may exist between the defen-
dants.3 Even if separate counsel were not required, a defendant would 
often prefer to have his own attorney rather than share one with another 
defendant. Therefore, in order to coordinate their defenses, joint defen-
dants represented by separate attorneys often enter into joint defense 
agreements. 
The areas typically covered by joint defense agreements include 
exchanging information about the merits of the case, dividing responsibil-
ity for pre-trial motions and discovery, sharing costs of expert witnesses, 
discussing strategies of defense, and exchanging legal memoranda.4 
t B.A. (1973), University of Pennsylvania; J.D. (1976) George Washington Univer-
sity. The author is currently a Professor at the University of Baltimore School of Law. 
I See, e.g., The Corporate Counsel Section of the New York State Bar Ass 'n, Report 
on Cost-Effective Management of Corporate Litigation, 59 ALBANY L. REv. 263, 308-
12 (1995) [hereinafter Report]; Richard A. Horder, Case Management of Mass Tort 
Litigation from the Perspective of Inside Counsel: What Clients Want in Preparation 
and Trial of a Toxic Tort Case (PLI Litig. & Administrative Practice Course Handbook, 
1988). 
2 See, e.g., Susan K. Rushing, Note, Separating the Joint Defense Doctrine from 
the Attorney-Client Privilege, 68 TEXAS L. REv. 1273 (1990). 
3 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1983). 
4 Deborah Stanville Bartel, Reconceptualizating the Joint Defense Doctrine, 65 
FORDHAM L. REv. 871, 875-79 (1996); Rushing, supra note 2, at 1273; Report, supra 
note 1, at 309. 
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Althoughjoint defense agreements may appear to be part of a conspiracy 
to thwart the integrity of litigation, in general, joint defense agreements 
are well accepted as beneficial to both litigants and the system in general. 
By pennitting parties to cooperate in their defenses, litigation becomes 
more efficient. 5 Fuller infonnation is gathered more cheaply.6 Inconsis-
tent defenses that put defendants in an unfair position and that may 
confuse the jury can be avoided.7 
Significant to the development and growth ofj oint defense agreements 
has been the evidentiary joint defense privilege.s Under this privilege, 
communications among defendants and their respective counsel are 
protected from disclosure.9 Ifthe privilege is to attach, the communica-
tion must be made in the course of the cooperative effort and intended 
to further that effort.lo The evidentiary joint defense privilege is an 
exception to the general rule that the attorney client privilege does not 
apply when a privileged communication between a client and his attorney 
is made in the presence of a third person. I I The joint defense privilege 
grants an evidentiary privilege for communications from non-clients to 
lawyers. 12 The joint defense privilege also protects matters that are 
covered by the work product privilege and, in some respects, provides 
protection beyond that granted by the traditional work product doctrine. 13 
The evidentiary joint defense privilege, however, does not apply in 
litigation between members of the joint defense. 14 
The joint defense privilege has endured some scholarly review. 15 One 
particular issue studied is what occurs in a criminal case when one co-
S Bartel, supra note 4, at 882-83; Gerald Heller, Raising the Joint Defense Privilege, 
FED. LAW., Jan. 1997, at 46. 
6 Report, supra note 1, at 309. 
7 Bartel, supra note 4, at 873, 881. 
8 Heller, supra note 5, at 46. 
9 !d. 
10 ld. at 48. 
Illd. at 46. 
12 Rushing, supra note 2, at 1273. 
\3 Bartel, supra note 4, at 874. 
14 Heller, supra note 5, at 48-49. 
IS Bartel, supra note 4, at 871; Heller, supra note 5, at 46. 
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defendant decides to cooperate with the prosecution and testify against 
his former co-defendants. 16 An issue that has received little commentary 
is the issue of the disqualification of an attorney and that attorney's law 
firm in separate litigation based on a motion by a member of a prior joint 
defense agreement of which the attorney's former client was also a 
member. Recently, various courts have addressed this issue.17 The 
purpose ofthis Article is to review and analyze the cases that have dealt 
with the issue of joint defense agreements and motions for disqualifica-
tion of another member's attorney in subsequent cases. The goal of this 
Article is to reach a better understanding ofthe present state ofthe law. 
The Article then proposes an analysis for use in future cases. 
II. Doctrinal Development 
of the Joint Defense Privilege 
The first case involving a member of a joint defense who sought to 
disqualify an attorney of another joint defense member in subsequent 
litigation was Wilson P. Abraham Construction Corp. v. Armco Steel 
Corp., 18 which involved alleged antitrust violations in the steel industry. 
In 1972, Whitlow Co., Inc. (Whitlow) was one of the targets of a federal 
grand jury investigation of the trade practices ofthe rebar steel industry 
in Texas. 19 Whitlow was represented by Stephen Susman ofthe Fulbright 
& Jaworski law firm.20 After indictments were issued against various 
steel companies, including Whitlow, Armco Steel Corp., The Ceco Corp. 
and Laclede Steel Co., Susman, as counsel for Whitlow, met more than 
16 See, e.g., Bartel, supra note 4, at 872; Heller, supra note S, at 48; Matthew D. 
Forsgren, Note, The Outer Edge of the Envelope: Disqualification of White Collar 
Criminal Defense Attorneys Under the Joint Defense Doctrine, 78 MINN. L. REv. 1219, 
1222 (1994). 
17 In 1988, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit noted that 
disqualification motions were becoming more numerous because the changing nature 
of the legal profession was presenting a greater number of potential conflicts. Manning 
v. Waring, Cox,James, Sklar & Allen, 849 F.2d222, 224-2S (6thCir. 1988). Thecourt 
noted that firms were employing hundreds oflawyers, and that specialists were being 
concentrated under fewer roofs. /d. at 224. 
18 SS9 F.2d 2S0 (Sth Cir. 1977). 
19 Abraham Const. Corp., SS9 F.2d at 2S1. 
20/d. 
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once with representatives of the other defendants in order to develop a 
cooperative defense plan.21 At the same time as the Texas investigation, 
a related but separate antitrust investigation of the steel industry was 
taking place in Louisiana, which ultimately led to indictments and a civil 
action in Louisiana.22 Whitlow was not a defendant in the Louisiana 
actions, but several ofthe defendants in the Texas cases, namely Annco, 
Ceco and Laclede, were defendants in the Louisiana case.23 
WilsonP. Abraham Construction Corp. (Abraham Construction) was 
a plaintiff in the Louisiana ci viI action.24 Members ofthe Louisiana steel 
industry that were involved in the Texas litigation objected when 
Abraham Construction sought to hire Susman as co-counse1.25 The 
Louisiana steel industry defendants argued that Susman should be 
disqualified from representing Abraham Construction in its civil suit 
against them in Louisiana because Susman had been privy to confidential 
information as part of the cooperative defense discussions in Texas.26 
The main issue was whether someone who was never a client of an 
attorney could seek disqualification of that attorney.27 
The Fifth Circuit noted that ifthe motion had been filed by a former 
client, disqualification would be required based solely on proof that a 
substantial relationship existed between the two matters.28 No proof 
would be required that any confidential information had been disclosed, 
nor that any confidential information would be used to the detriment of 
the attorney's former client. 29 The Fifth Circuit noted, however, that these 
rules did not apply when a non-client sought disqualification.30 
21 [d. A civil suit was also filed in Texas involving the same antitrust issues which 
the grand jury had investigated. [d. at 252. Susman was also the lawyer for Whitlow 
in this civil case; however, Susman denied doing anything of substance in defense of 
the civil case. [d. 
22 [d. at 252. 
23 [d. 
24 Abraham Constr. Corp., 559 F.2d 250. 
2S !d. at 252. 
26 [d. 
27 !d. at 253 .. 
28 !d. at 252. 
29 Abraham Constr. Corp., 559 F.2d at 252. 
30 !d. at 253. 
1998] JOINT DEFENSE AGREEMENTS 315 
The Fifth Circuit did not state, however, that a disqualification motion 
could not be filed by a person who was never a client of the attorney in 
question.31 Rather, the court held that when information not intended for 
unlimited pUblication or use is exchanged between co-defendants and 
their attorneys, an attorney who has received such information owes a 
fiduciary duty to non-client co-defendants not to use it in a later represen-
tation of another client to the detriment of his former client's co-defen-
dants.32 When a disqualification motion is filed by a party who was not 
a former client ofthe attorney whose disqualification is sought, the Fifth 
Circuit places the burden of proof on the moving party to show that 
confidential information had been disclosed to the attorney during an 
earlier cooperative defense.33 InAbraham Construction Corp., a remand 
was necessary to determine whether Susman had in fact received 
confidential information from Whitlow's Texas co-defendants.34 Upon 
remand, the district court found that Susman had not been privy to 
confidential information from any of the co-defendants in the Texas 
antitrust cases, and thus, Susman was not disqualified.3s 
The Fifth Circuit's opinion in Abraham Construction Corp. is 
significant for a few reasons. First, it recognized the right of a non-client 
to seek disqualification of an attorney absent an express joint defense 
agreement among the co-defendants and their attorneys.36 Second, 
although recognizing the non-client's right to seek disqualification, the 
Fifth Circuit refused to equate the non-client' s rights with those of actual 
former clients.37 Unlike the former client situation, the court required 
proofby the non-client moving party of actual disclosure of confidential 
information before disqualification would be ordered.38 
31 See id. 
32 [d. 
33/d. 
34 Abraham Constr. Corp., 559 F.2d at 253. 
35 Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 1979 WL 1614, * 1 (E.D. 
La. Mar. 28, 1979). 
36 See Abraham Constr. Corp., 559 F.2d at 252. 
37 [d. at 253. 
38 [d. 
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About the same time the Fifth Circuit was deciding the disqualification 
motion inAbraham Construction Corp., the Eighth Circuit faced a similar 
issue in Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil CO.39 Fred Weber, Inc. (Weber) 
brought a civil antitrust case against various oil companies, including 
Shell Oil Co. and American Oil Co.40 About ten years prior to this civil 
litigation, in a previous criminal antitrust case, Weber's counsel, Lashly, 
Caruthers, Thies, Rava & Hamel (Lashly), had also been counsel to co-
defendants of Amoco and Shell.41 Amoco and Shell sought to disqualify 
Lashly from representing Weber, alleging that members ofthe law firm 
had access to confidential information obtained at meetings of co-
defendants' counsel that were held to discuss defense strategy during the 
earlier criminallitigation.42 Lashly replied that it never represented Shell 
or Amoco; it never received confidential information from Shell or 
Amoco; and that absent proof that it had received confidential information 
from Shell or Amoco, disqualification was not warranted.43 The district 
court judge ordered an in-camera inspection of the alleged confidential 
information that Shell and Amoco had disclosed to members ofLashly 
in the earlier criminal case.44 Based upon this in-camera hearing, the 
judge found that no confidential information had been exchanged, and 
therefore he denied the motion to disqualify.45 
The issue on appeal was whether a lawyer's representation of A, who 
was also a co-defendant with B in a prior suit, disqualified the lawyer as 
representative for C against B in a subsequent, related suit.46 The court 
identified the instant case as one of "first recorded impression.,>47 The 
Eighth Circuit first considered Canon 4 of the Code of Professional 
Responsibility, which concerns confidentiality.48 The court stated that 
39 566 F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1977) (overruled on other grounds; overruled as to order 
denying disqualification motion being fmal and appealable). 





45 Fred Weber, Inc., 566 F.2d at 605. 
46Id. at 606. 
47Id. 
48 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1980) (providing that 
"[a] lawyer should preserve the confidences and secrets of a client"). 
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Canon 4 is limited to the duty a lawyer owes his client. Therefore, in 
order to employ Canon 4 as a basis for an attorney's disqualification, the 
moving party must have or have had an attorney-client relationship with 
the attorney who is the target ofthe disqualification motion.49 Because 
no members ofLashly ''were engaged by, or advised or represented, Shell 
or Amoco in the prior antitrust suit," Canon 4 was "inapplicable.,,5o 
The Eighth Circuit also considered Canon 9 of the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, which provides for an injunction against conduct 
that creates an appearance of impropriety. 51 The court stated the issue 
as whether a member of the public or the bar would see impropriety in 
the mere representation of C against B by a lawyer who had represented 
B 's co-defendant in a prior related suit. 52 The court's response was : "We 
think not" because "the public and the bar are aware that particular 
lawyers have specialized in certain areas . . . and that their number is 
limited within specific geographical limits. ,,53 The court believed that 
"[i]t would be neither surprising nor unexpected that the same lawyer 
would appear for plaintiffs and defendants, and that a present adverse 
party may have been on the other side in a prior case. ,,54 It also believed 
that "[t]o hold that every representation against a former client's co-
defendant in a related matter raises an appearance of impropriety" would 
unnecessarily restrict the choice of counsel available to litigants.,,55 
The Eighth Circuit also rejected the application of an irrebuttable 
presumption of shared confidences from B to A's lawyers.56 The court 
was unwilling to presume a "lack of integrity" in A's lawyer knowingly 
accepting representation against a party from whom or about whom 
confidential information had been obtained. 57 The proper approach to 
Canon 9's appearance of impropriety was to determine whether A's 
49 Fred Weber, Inc., 566 F.2d at 607-08. 
50ld. at 608. 
51 Canon 9 provides: "A lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional 
impropriety." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (1980). 





57 Fred Weber, Inc., 566 F.2d at 609. 
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counsel, Lashly, had actually obtained confidential information while 
representing a co-defendant of Shell or Amoco in the prior litigation.58 
Shell and Amoco had the burden of showing an actual imparting of 
information. 59 Because the in-camera submissions failed to demonstrate 
that confidential information had been disclosed to members ofLashly, 
disqualification was not ordered.60 
A few points are worth noting about the Fred Weber, Inc. opinion. 
First, the court rejected using the ethical obligation of confidentiality as 
the basis of possible disqualification, relying instead on the appearance 
of impropriety.61 Unlike the Fifth Circuit in Wilson P. Abraham 
Construction Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp.,62 the Eighth Circuit did not 
view the relevant issue as one involving an attorney's fiduciary duty to 
a non-client, but rather viewed the matter from the perspective ofwhether 
the public or the bar would see impropriety in the representation.63 
Although taking a different approach, the Eighth Circuit's answer to the 
issue presented was identical to that of the Fifth Circuit's opinion in 
Abraham Construction COrp.64 The court's answer was that disqualifica-
tion was warranted only ifthe moving party demonstrated that confiden-
tial information had actually been transmitted to the lawyer from the 
lawyer's former client's co-defendant.65 Both courts rejected any pre-
sumption of shared confidences.66 
The next significant case, Kaskie v. Celotex Corp, was decided by a 
federal district judge in Illinois in 1985.67 Felix Kaskie sued Atchinson, 
Topeka and Santa Fe Railway (Railway) and various asbestos manufac-
turers, including Celotex, claiming to have suffered from exposure to 
S8Id. 
s9Id. at 610. 
60 Id. 
61/d. at 609. 
62 559 F.2d 250 (5th CiT. 1977). 
63 Fred Weber, Inc., 566 F.2d at 609. 
64 559 F.2d at 250; see also Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804 (5th 
Cir. 1976). 
6S Fred Weber, Inc., 566 F.2d at 609. 
66Id. 
067 618 F. Supp. 696 (N.D. Ill. 1985). 
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asbestos while working as a Railway employee.68 A few years prior to 
Kaskie's lawsuit, various asbestos manufacturers, including Celotex, and 
various asbestos distributors had formed an Asbestos Defense Group 
(ADG) in response to asbestos litigation across the country.69 The 
purpose of this ADG was to coordinate discovery, plan strategy, and 
facilitate settlements.7o 
In response to Kaskie' s complaint, Railway filed a cross-claim against 
the asbestos manufacturer defendants.71 Railway hired the law firm of 
Jacobs, Williams and Montgomery (JWM) as additional counsel to pursue 
this cross-claim.72 However, JWM had represented Standard Asbestos, 
an asbestos manufacturer.73 Standard was not a defendant in the Kaskie 
case, but it was amemberofthe ADG.74 As Standard's counsel in other 
asbestos cases, JWM had attended meetings ofthe ADG with companies 
that were defendants in Kaskie's lawsuit.75 Celotex moved to disqualify 
JWM as counsel for Railway, alleging that confidential information, 
which JWM could now use in litigating Railway's cross-claim, had been 
exchanged during the ADG meetings.76 In asserting this claim, Celotex 
relied on Canons 4 and 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.77 
The judge first reasoned that "[i]fCanon 4 were read literally, Celotex 
might not have standing to asset this violation because [Celotex] ha[d] 
never been a client of [JWM].,,78 However, the judge declined to read 
Canon 4 as narrowly and held that Celotex did have standing to seek 
disqualification of Railway's attorney under Canon 4 because Celotex 
was claiming a breach of confidential information.79 Additionally, Celotex 





73 Kaskie, 618 F. Supp. at 697. 
74 [d. 
7S /d. at 698. 
76 [d. 
77 [d. 
78 Kaskie, 618 F. Supp. at 698. 
79/d. 
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had standing under Canon 9 because Canon 9's purpose was to ensure 
public confidence in the legal profession, and create a "zone of interest" 
as broad, ifnot broader, than Canon 4.80 The judge's decision was in-
fluenced by the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit in Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 81 
which involved members of a trade association providing confidential 
information to the trade association's attorneys. The district court judge 
in Kaslde interpreted Westinghouse to have broadened the concept of 
client "to include a relationship between an attorney and another entity 
(person or corporation) that involves a fiduciary obligation resulting from 
'the nature of the work performed and the circumstances under which 
confidential information is divulged. ",82 
After ruling that Celotex had standing to seek JWM' s disqualification, 
the next issue was what would warrant JWM's disqualification.83 The 
court held that the irrebuttable presumption of shared confidences, which 
applied when a law firm switched sides to represent an adversary of a 
former client, only "makes sense" when an actual attorney-client rela-
tionship exists.84 However, no irrebuttable presumption is found in this 
co-defendant context because these co-defendants are not likely "to bare 
their souls to each other. ,,85 The better approach in the co-defendant 
situation would be to apply a rebuttable presumption of shared confi-
dences.86 In this regard, the judge ruled that JWM had an obligation to 
"show clearly and persuasively that it did not receive any confidences 
from Celotex during the ADG meetings,,87 ifit wanted to avoid disqualifi-
cation in Kaskie's case. Because JWM only presented one affidavit 
denying receipt of confidential information, the court found JWM's 
showing to be insufficient to rebut the presumption of shared confi-
80 Id. at 698-99. 
81 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978). 
82 Kaskie, 618 F. Supp. at 698; see Westinghouse, 580 F.2d at 1320. 




87 Id. at 700. 
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dences.88 However, the law firm had been "resting on the hope that 
Celotex would have the burden to prove confidential information was 
exchanged" (a position now rejected by the district judge); as a result, 
JWM was given another opportunity to prove that it had not received such 
information. 89 
The approach ofthe Kaskie court differs in a couple of respects from 
the earlier approaches adopted by the Fifth and Eighth Circuits. First, 
Kaskie held that a non-client could rely on the ethical obligation of 
confidentiality found in Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity as a basis for disqualification of a joint defense member's attorney. 90 
Second, although agreeing that an irrebuttable presumption of shared 
confidences was inappropriate, the Kaskie court placed the burden of 
proofon the law firm that was the subject ofthe disqualification motion 
in order to show that confidential information had not been exchanged.91 
This aspect is different from the earlier cases that placed the burden of 
proof on the moving party to show that such information had been 
exchanged.92 
The next significant discussions regarding this issue occurred in 1995 
when the American Bar Association Committee on Ethics and Profes-
sional Responsibility (ABA) issued Ethics Opinion 95-395.93 This 
Opinion involved a lawyer who had represented one member of a joint 
defense group and then, after changing law firms, was asked to represent 
a new client against a different member of the original joint defense 
groUp.94 The ABA Opinion first stated that the lawyer owed no ethical 
responsibility under Rule 1.6 ofthe Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
(Confidentiality of Information) to non-client members of the joint 
88 Kaskie, 618 F. Supp. at 700. 
89 !d. 
90 Id. at 698. 
91 [d. at 700. 
92 See Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 559 F.2d 250 (5th 
Cir. 1977); Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1977). 
93 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-395 (1995) 
[hereinafter ABA Opinion]. 
94Id. 
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defense groUp.95 The lawyer's duty under Rule 1.6 applied only to the 
lawyer's client. 96 Therefore, disclosure and use of any relevant confiden-
tial information would be ethically permissible if the former client 
consented. The ABA Opinion noted, however, that ifthe former client 
contractually agreed with the other members ofthe joint defense group 
to preserve the confidentiality of the exchanged information, and the 
former client then consented to the lawyer's use of the information, 
although the lawyer would have satisfied his ethical obligation under Rule 
1.6, the client could be held liable for breaching the confidentiality 
agreement. 97 The ABA Opinion also rejected any duty of a lawyer to his 
former client's co-defendants under Rule 1.9 of the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct because in such a situation no attorney-client 
relationship exists with the former client's co-defendants.98 The ABA 
Opinion continued, however, that although there was no duty of the 
lawyer to the former client's co-defendants under the Model Rules of 
95 The Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides in relevant part that "[a] 
lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client 
consents after consultation." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 
(1980) (amended 1995). 
96 ABA Opinion, supra note 93. 
97 [d. 
98 !d. Rule 1.9 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides: 
(a) A lawyer who has fonnerly represented a client in a matter shaH not thereaf-
ter represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which 
that person's interests are materialIy adverse to the interests of the fonner client 
unless the fonner client consents after consultation. 
(b) A lawyer shall not knowingly represent a person in the same or a substan-
tialIy related matter in which a finn with which the lawyer fonnerly was associated 
had previously represented a client 
(I) whose interests are materially adverse to that person; and 
(2) about whom the lawyer had acquired infonnation protected by Rules 1.6 
and 1.9(c) that is material to the matter; unless the fonner client consents after 
consultation. 
(c) A lawyer who has fonnerly represented a client in a matter or whose present 
or fonner finn has fonnerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter: 
(I) use infonnation relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the 
fonner client except as Rule 1.6 or Rule 3.3 would permit or require with respect 
to a client, or when the infonnation has become generally known; or 
(2) reveal infonnation relating to the representation except as Rule 1.6 or Ru Ie 
3.3 would pennit or require with respect to a client. 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 1.9 (1987) (amended 1995). 
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Professional Conduct, the lawyer "almost surely has a fiduciary obligation 
to the other members that might lead to his disqualification under case 
law.,,99 
In 1995 the Texas Court of Appeals decided Rio Hondo Implement 
Co. v. Euresti. IOO George and Frances Nixon, d/b/a Nixon Farms, hired 
Bruce Hodge to represent them in a lawsuit against Porteous Fasteners 
and Rio Hondo Implement Co. (Rio Hondo) for damages resulting from 
the alleged improper repair of farm equipment. 101 Anthony James 
represented Porteous Fasteners. 102 Patricia Kelly represented Rio 
Hondo. 103 Although Porteous Fasteners and Rio Hondo had cross actions 
against each other, Kelly and James met to discuss trial strategy in the 
Nixons' case against them. 104 Allegedly, at this meeting, confidential 
documents were examined, and the attorneys jointly decided how to 
present evidence of their affirmative defenses and how to use their 
peremptory challenges. lOS Before trial, Porteous Fasteners settled with 
the Nixons. ,06 After Porteous Fasteners settled, James (Porteous Fasten-
ers's former lawyer) and Hodge (the Nixons' attorney) decided to become 
partners. 107 Briefly after formation ofthe new partnership, Rio Hondo 
moved to disqualify Hodge and the law firm of Hodge & James as the 
attorneys for the Nixons. ,08 The motion was based upon Rio Hondo's 
sharing of confidential information with James when he represented 
Porteous Fasteners. 109 James denied that confidential information had 
99 The ABA Opinion did not address whether the attorney would be in breach of 
a duty to his client if the attorney asked for consent to permit disclosure. ABA Opinion, 
supra note 93. 
100 903 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. App. 1995). 
101 Rio Hondo, 903 S.W.2d at 129. Rio Hondo made the repair. /d. Porteous 
Fasteners was an upstream supplier of the allegedly defective lockwashers installed by 
Rio Hondo. [d. 
102 [d. 
103 [d. 
104 /d. at 129. 
lOS /d. 
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been shared because the cross actions between Rio Hondo and Porteous 
Fasteners had been serious: 10 
The Texas appeals court first held that the Texas Disciplinary Rules 
involving confidentiality I II or former client conflict of interest I 12 did not 
address the issue presented. 113 The Texas court, however, relying on both 
Wilson P. Abraham Construction Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp. 114 and Fred 
Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil CO.,IIS held that, in order for Rio Hondo's 
disqualification motion to be granted, Rio Hondo must prove that 
confidential information had been shared with James while James was 
Porteous Fasteners's attorney, and that the present matter was substan-
tially related to the previous matter during which confidential information 
had been exchanged. I 16 The Texas appeals court held that Rio Hondo had 
not met its burden of proving that confidential information had been 
exchanged. I 17 
Although the Texas appeals court cited Abraham Construction Corp. 
and Fred Weber, Inc.; the Rio Hondo holding appears narrower than the 
holdings in those cases.118 The court required the party moving for 
disqualification to prove the exchange of confidential information and 
that the two matters were substantially related. I 19 
At about the same time the Texas appeals court decided Rio Hondo, 
a federal district court in Texas decided Turner v. Firestone Tire & 
Rubber CO. 120 Turner was a toxic tort case brought by past and present 
\lOId. 
III TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.05. 
112 TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.09. 
113 Rio Hondo, 903 S.W.2d at 131. The court accepted the position that the Texas 
Rules of Evidence recognized a joint defense privilege as part of the attorney-client 
privilege, but rejected Rio Hondo's claim that the evidentiary privilege essentially 
makes counsel for one defendant the counsel for all defendants with respect to confi-
dential information obtained through a joint defense. Id. 
\14559 F.2d 250 (5th Cir. 1977). 
\IS 566 F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1977). 




120 896 F. Supp. 651 (E.D. Tex. 1995). 
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employees ofthe Red River Army Depot alleging injuries resulting from 
exposure to toxic fumes, steam, smoke and other toxic substances released 
into the atmosphere from rubber products manufactured by various 
defendants. 121 A few years earlier in Fleenor v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber 
Co., other employees at the same army depot brought a similar suit 
against rubber manufacturers Goodyear, Firestone, and Tocco, Inc. 122 The 
defendants in Fleenor entered into a joint defense agreement in which 
their defense lawyers "agreed to pool resources, divide work assignments, 
and ... discuss defense strategy.,,123 Defense counsel in this case met 
monthly at which time each participant would sign a confidentiality 
agreement verifying that none ofthem had made any settlement with the 
plaintiffs, and that any information exchanged was to be considered 
confidential. 124 The law firm of Gooding and Dodson (G&D) represented 
Tocco in the Fleenor case. 125 
Monty Murry was a member ofG&D while G&D represented Tocco 
in Fleenor. 126 Although Murry did some work for Tocco in the Fleenor 
case, he never attended any of the joint defense meetings or signed any 
of the confidentiality agreements, although he apparently did attend a 
meeting with attorneys for the other defendants regarding discovery. 127 
At this discovery meeting, the parties' counsel decided which attorney 
121 Turner, 896 F. Supp. at 652. 
122 !d. 
123 !d. The joint defense agreement provided: 
Each ofthe undersigned are attendees at the Joint Defense Counsel meeting referred 
to above. Each of the undersigned represent that at the time of this meeting neither 
they nor their clients have made any type of settlement with the Plaintiffs or any 
other party or non-party to this matter and further represent that they have not made 
any type of ... deal where they would share information disclosed in this meeting 
to anyone other than their clients and those persons who are necessarily involved 
in the defense of that client. It is understood that the communications which take 
place today are intended to be confidential and are subject to any and all privileges 
which are commonly referred to as the joint defense privileges, which privileges 
may be raised by anyone or more of the undersigned and will be honored by all of 
the undersigned. 
Turner, 896 F. Supp. at 652 n.3. 
124 Turner, 896 F. Supp. at 652. 
125Id. 
126 !d. 
127 !d. at 652 n.2 
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would argue at an upcoming hearing. 128 Before the Fleenor case was 
resolved, Murry left G&D to become a founding member ofthe law firm, 
Murry & Griffin (M&G).129 Shortly thereafter, the plaintiffs in Turner 
retained M&G.130 The original defendants in the Turner lawsuit included 
not only Goodyear and Firestone, but also TOCCO.131 Shortly after the 
filing ofthe complaint, however, Tocco was dismissed with prejudice. \32 
Tocco subsequently agreed to waive any conflict it might have with 
M&G's representation of the plaintiffs in Turner.133 Goodyear and 
Firestone, however, sought M&G' s disqualification, arguing that Murry's 
representation in Turner violated the conflict of interest rules ofthe Texas 
Disciplinary Rules. 134 Murry was also presumed to have gained confiden-
tial information from Firestone and Goodyear in the Fleenor case while 
he was a member of G&D. \35 
The federal district court judge refused to disqualify Murry and ruled 
that Goodyear and Firestone were not clients ofG&D because members 
of a joint defense group are not clients of another joint member's 
attorney.136 Only Tocco's consent was required for a valid waiver under 
the disciplinary rules.137 Additionally, an irrebuttable presumption of 
shared confidential communications was inappropriate because Firestone 
and Goodyear were not clients ofG&D, and an irrebuttable presumption 
only applied when an attorney-client relationship developed. 138 Support· 
for this position was found in the Eighth Circuit's opinion in Fred Weber, 
Inc., which the judge viewed as "virtually identical to the question facing 
this COurt.,,139 Finally, no evidence existed in support ofthe proposition 
128 !d. 
129 Turner, 896 F. Supp. at 652. 
130 Id. at 653. 
\31 Id. at 652. 
\32 !d. at 653. 
\33 !d. 
134 TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.06 & 1.09. 
135 Turner, 896 F. Supp. at 653. 
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that Murry actually received any confidential information from or about 
Firestone or Goodyear. 140 
Two important items are worth noting. First, the judge clearly rejected 
the position that joint defense members are clients of the attorney for 
another joint defense member. 141 Second, the judge was not troubled by 
the seemingly quid pro quo nature ofthe prejudicial dismissal of Tocco 
after Tocco's waiver of conflict. 142 
Insurance Co. a/North America v. Puerto Rico Marine Management, 
Inc. 143 presents a different variation ofthe same theme found in the cases 
previously discussed. Carl Coste sustained a work related injury and sued 
Puerto Rico Marine Management, Inc., Klinge Corp., and Copeland 
COrp.l44 During the trial, Copeland was dismissed with prejUdice by the 
plaintiff. 14s Shortly thereafter, a mistrial occurred as a result of Coste 
falling while leaving the witness stand. 146 Before a second trial could be 
held, Marine Management sought to retain Copeland's former lawyer for 
the upcoming trial. 147 Insurance Co. of North America (INA), Coste's 
insurance carrier, objected to Marine Management's motion to substitute 
Copeland's former counsel because after Copeland had been dismissed 
as a defendant, Copeland's counsel and Copeland's expert witness met 
with INA's counsel. I48 An allegation was put forth that during this 
meeting INA's counsel disclosed confidential information to Copeland's 
attorney. 149 In response to Marine Management's defense that no 
confidential information had been exchanged, the plaintiff filed affidavits 
indicating that Copeland's counsel and expert witness met with INA's 
counsel to discuss the expert's potential testimony and problems with it. ISO 
140 Turner, 896 F. Supp. at 654. 
141 [d. 
142Id. 
143 903 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. La. 1995). 





149 Insurance Co. o/N. Am., 903 F. Supp. at 1005. 
150 !d. at 1006. 
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The federal district judge first stated that Marine Management's 
conclusory, general statements that no confidential information had been 
disclosed were insufficient in light of plaintiff s detailed affidavit setting 
forth what had transpired at the meeting. lSI The judge thus found that 
confidential information was disclosed. In response to Marine Manage-
ment's argument that Copeland's former lawyer never signed an 
agreement with Marine Management not to assist the other defendants, 
the district judge ruled that such an agreement was "inconsequential" to 
the disqualification issue. IS2 Relying on Wilson P. Abraham Construction 
Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., IS3 the judge ruled that regardless of the 
absence of an agreement not to assist any other defendant, Copeland's 
former attorney had a fiduciary duty to not use confidential information 
received from plaintiff. ls4 The court therefore refused to permit Marine 
Management to substitute Copeland's former counsel as its own 
counsel. ISS 
The next relevant case, GTE North, Inc. v. Apache Products CO.,IS6 
involved a cost recovery action under the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation and Liability Act of1980 (CERCLA)ls7 by GTE 
North, Inc. against five defendants, one of which was Dean Foods Co. 
GTE sought to disqualify Dean Foods's counsel, Jon Faletto, and his firm 
of Howard & Howard (H&H).158 
In 1989, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
issued notification of Potentially Responsible Party (PRP) status to 
various companies for possible liability under CERCLA ls9 Five of the 
companies notified ofPRP status formed the Appleton Road Committee 
and executed ajoint remedial cost sharing agreement that allocated each 
member's share ofthe response cost. 160 Members ofthis committee also 
ISIId. 
IS2Id. 
IS3 559 F.2d 250, 253 (5th Cir. 1977). 
154 Insurance Co. olN. Am., 903 F. Supp. at 1006. 
ISS Id. at 1007. 
IS6 914 F. Supp. 1575 (N.D. Ill. 1996). 
IS742 V.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9675 (West 1995). 
IS8 GTE North, 914 F. Supp. at 1577. 
IS9 !d. 
160 Id. 
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agreed to cooperate in investigating and identifying additional PRPS. 161 
Also part ofthe agreement was that all infonnation would be held in strict 
confidence among the members, and that no member would take any civil 
action against any other member. 162 Two of the members ofthe Appleton 
Road Committee were Chrysler Corporation and GTE. 163 Some members 
ofthe Appleton Road Committee agreed to a second agreement concern-
ing the joint investigation of additional PRPS. I64 Chrysler and GTE 
signed this second joint agreement. 165 During this period, Jon Faletto of 
the H&H law finn represented Chrysler. 166 
As a result ofthe joint investigatory effort, infonnation was gathered 
and disseminated regarding the legal merit of possible lawsuits against 
other PRPs, one of which was Dean Foods.167 At the conclusion of the 
joint investigation, Chrsyler decided not to participate in any litigation 
for cost recovery against PRPs identified by the joint investigation. 168 
However, GTE and some other members of the joint agreement, on the 
other hand, decided to pursue cost recovery litigation against other PRPs, 
including Dean Foods. 169 Dean Foods then hired Faletto, Chrysler's 
fonner counsel, as its own counsel. 170 Chrysler gave Faletto its pennis-
sion for him and his finn to represent Dean Foods. 171 GTE, however, 
filed a motion to disqualify Faletto and H&H claiming that Faletto owed 
GTE a fiduciary duty to maintain its confidences based on an implied 
attorney-client relationship. 172 This implied attorney-client relationship 
arose from the "peculiar relationship between the members ofthe Cost 
Recovery Committee and the circumstances under which confidential 
161 !d. 
162 [d. 
163 GTE North, 914 F. Supp. at 1577. 
164 [d. at 1577-78. 
165 !d. 
166 !d. at 1578. 
167 [d. 
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information was disclosed. ,,173 GTE emphasized in support of its position 
the express confidentiality provisions in the two agreements, and the fact 
that confidential information and legal strategy had been freely exchanged 
between the companies and their attorneys.174 Faletto and H&H con-
tended that, in order for an implied attorney-client relationship to exist, 
GTE must show that it supplied information to Faletto with the reasonable 
belief that Faletto was acting as GTE's attorney.175 
The federal district judge evaluated the disqualification issue under 
Rule 1.9 regarding former client-conflict of interese76 and Rule 1.10 
regarding law firm disqualification,177 of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct for the Northern District of Illinois. 178 The judge first discussed 
whether GTE satisfied the threshold requirement of being a former client 
for purposes of Rule 1.9. 179 Because GTE obviously never shared an 
express attorney-client relationship with Faletto or H&H, the issue 
became "whether some sort offiduciaryrelationship arose between them 
that would make GTE a 'former client'" of Faletto and H&H.180 
Regarding this point, the judge looked to Westinghouse Electric Corp. 
v. Kerr-McGee Corp., decided by the Seventh Circuit. 181 Westinghouse 
involved a law firm's representation of a trade association and the receipt 
of confidential information from the trade association's members. 182 The 
district judge cited Westinghouse to support the proposition "that a 
'fiduciary relationship [on a lawyer's part] may result because of the 
nature ofthe work performed and the circumstances under which [the] 
confidential information is divulged. ",183 In the GTE case, because 
173 GTE North, 914 F. Supp. at 1578. 
174 [d. 
175 [d. 
176 [d. at 1578-79. 
177 [d. 
178 GTE North, 914 F. Supp. at 1578-79. 
179 [d. at 1579. 
180 [d. 
181 [d. (citing Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978)). 
182 Westinghouse, 580 F.2d at 1313. 
183 GTE North, 914 F. Supp. at 1580 (quoting Westinghouse, 580 F.2d at 1319). 
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counsel for each joint defense member freely discussed investigation 
results, strategy, and the merits of cases against additional PRP's, 
including Dean Foods, a fiduciary relationship existed between GTE and 
Faletto. 184 This duty occurred because information collected by GTE was 
jointly shared, discussed, and disseminated as part of a joint defense. 185 
Therefore, GTE had the right to seek Faletto' s disqualification under Rule 
1.9. 
When the court applied Rule 1.9 to the situation where no direct or 
express attorney-client relationship existed, it believed that no presump-
tion of shared confidences was appropriate. 186 The court required a 
showing that the attorney subject to the disqualification motion was 
actually privy to confidential information. 187 The undisputed facts as 
presented to the court proved that confidential information had been 
exchanged.188 Therefore, F aletto' s representation of Dean Foods violated 
Rule 1.9, and this violation required his disqualification. 189 In regard to 
the disqualification of Faletto's law firm, H&H, the court found an 
irrebuttable presumption that Faletto shared confidences with others in 
the law firm.190 Thus, Rule 1.10 required disqualification of the entire 
firm. 191 
This district court opinion was important in two respects. First, the 
judge believed that in order to disqualify Faletto, it must decide whether 
GTE was a "former client" of Faletto.192 Second, the court applied an 
irrebuttable presumption of shared confidences to vicariously disqualify 
Faletto's entire law firm. 193 
184 [d. at 1581. 
18S [d. 
186 [d. at 1580. 
187 !d. 
188 GTE North, 914 F. Supp. at 1581. 
189 !d. 
190 !d. 
191 Id. This waS so even though Illinois follows a minority approach and permits 
screening when the law ftrm is not switching sides. See Analytica, Inc. v. NPD 
Research, Inc., 708 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1983). 
192 GTE North, 914 F. Supp. at 1578-80. 
193 !d. at 1581. 
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The next significant case involving a disqualification motion resulting 
from a joint defense agreement was National Medical Enterprises Inc. 
v. Godbey, a decision by the Texas Supreme Court. 194 National Medical 
Enterprises (NME) and others had been targets of a criminal investigation 
and various related civil lawsuits involving allegations of mistreatment 
of patients and the defrauding of insurance companies in connection with 
the operation of more than seventy psychiatric hospitals across the United 
States. 195 Employees and former employees ofNME also faced possible 
personal liability for their conduct on behalf ofNME. 196 NME agreed 
to retain independent counsel to represent these employees. 197 NME hired 
Ed Tomko, an attorney with the law firm ofDoke & Riley (but who later 
joined the law firm of Baker & Botts), to represent one of its employees, 
Ronald Cronen. 198 Cronen was a target of the grandjury investigation. 199 
Tomko advised Cronen on various matters relating to the criminal 
investigation and discovery in the civil actions.20o Although Cronen was 
never indicted by the grand jury, he was named as a defendant in over 
thirty civil cases.201 In every civil case, however, the claims against him 
were dismissed with no finding ofliability.202 
Tomko was retained by NME to provide legal advice to James Wicoff, 
another NME employee who was also a target of a grand jury investiga-
tion and a defendant in numerous civil suits.203 Like Cronen; Wicoff was 
never indicted or held liable in any ofthe civil cases.204 Tomko's joint 
representation of Cronen and Wicofflasted about one year. 205 During the 
first seven months of his joint representation, Tomko was at Doke & 
194 924 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. 1996). 





200 Godbey, 924 S.W.2d at 124. 
201 Jd. 
202 [d. 
203 [d. at 125. 
204 [d. 
205 Godbey, 924 S.W.2d at 125. 
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Riley and billed approximately $18,000.206 The last five months of the 
joint representation were while Tomko was with Baker & Botts; the 
billing for this period was only about $700.207 NME paid these bills.208 
Tomko received confidential communications from Cronen and Wicoff, 
as well as from NME (which was separately represented by counsel).209 
Tomko's discussions with NME were subject to a written joint defense 
agreement which Tomko and Wicoff signed and Cronen and NME 
acknowledged applied to them.21O The agreement protected disclosures 
to any third party, but reserved the right of each member to take action 
against any other member.2l1 This agreement also provided that each 
client understood that only its own attorney represented it, and that an 
attorney owed a duty ofloyalty to his own client only.212 
Shortly after the joint defense agreement was executed, Tomko and 
Baker & Botts withdrew from representing Cronen and Wicoff for reasons 
206ld. 
2071d. 
2081d. at 124. 
209 ld. at 125. 
210 Godbey, 924 S.W.2d at 125. 
2111d. 
212 The agreement in relevant part read: 
1. Unless expressly stated in writing to the contrary, any communications between 
or among any of the client members and/or the attorney members concerning the 
[investigations and litigation involving NME] are confidential and are protected 
from disclosure to any third party by the joint defense privilege, the attorney-client 
privilege and the work product doctrine. 
3. None of the information obtained by any client member or attorney member 
pursuant to this agreement shall be disclosed to any third party without the consent 
of the attorney member who disclosed the information in the first instance. 
6. Each client member understands and acknowledges ... that he or she is repre-
sented only by his or her own attorney in this matter; that while the attorneys 
representing the other members have a duty to preserve the confidences disclosed 
to them pursuant to this agreement, they will not be acting as his or her attorney in 
this matter; and that the attorney representing the other client members will owe a 
duty ofloyaJty to their own respective clients only. Each client member further 
understands and acknowledges that the attorney members representing other client 
members have the right, and may well have the obligation, to take actions against 
his or her own interest. ... 
Godbey, 924 S.W.2d at 125. 
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unrelated to the issue in the present case.213 About seventeen months 
later, lawyers at Baker & Botts who had not been involved in the prior 
representation of Cronen and Wicoff sued NME on behalf of a large 
number of former patients at NME hospitals.214 The lawsuit was based 
on grounds similar to the eaflier cases.215 Neither Cronen or Wicoffwere 
named as defendants in these civil suits, although Cronen's immediate 
predecessor as regional administrator for NME was named as a 
defendant. 216 NME moved to disqualify Baker & BottS.217 The trial judge 
denied NME' s motion.218 He ruled that Baker & Botts could be disquali-
fied only if it had actually represented NME, if Baker & Botts owed a 
duty ofloyalty to NME based on its representation of Cronen and Wicoff 
or based on the joint defense agreement, or if Baker & Botts was actually 
misusing NME's confidences.219 Because the trial judge found none of 
these circumstances to have been established, NME's motion was 
denied.220 
The Texas Supreme Court reversed and ordered the disqualification 
of Baker & Botts.221 The court first recognized that the present action was 
substantially related to the earlier representation involving Cronen and 
Wicoff.222 If Tomko had represented NME in the earlier action, then 
Baker & Botts would clearly be disqualified in this case. However, the 
court held that Tomko had not represented NME either by his representa-
tion of Cronen and Wicoff or by virtue ofthe joint defense agreement.223 
213 Godbey, 924 S.W.2d at 125. 
214 [d. at 126. 
215 !d. 
216 !d. 
217 !d. Cronen also filed his own motion seeking Baker & Botts' disqualification. 
!d. 
218 Godbey, 924 S.W.2d at 126. 
219 [d. 
220 [d. Cronen's motion was also denied because although this case was substan-
tially related to Cronen's case, the trial judge ruled that this case was not adverse to 
Cronen, and that it was not reasonably probable that Cronen's confidences would be 
misused. [d. at 126-27. 
221 !d. 
222 !d. at 129. 
223 Godbey, 924 S.W.2d at 129. 
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The Court did find, however, that the joint defense agreement created a 
duty for Tomko regarding non-clients.224 Under the joint defense 
agreement, Tomko had "strictly promised" not to disclose information 
to third parties.225 Pursuant to the joint defense agreement, Tomko 
admittedly had obtained confidential information from NME.226 Tomko 
thus owed a duty of confidentiality to NME.227 Citing Wilson P. Abraham 
Construction Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp.,228 the Texas Supreme Court 
noted that, although the Fifth Circuit described the relationship between 
the attorney and his client's co-counsel as "resembling an attorney-client 
relationship," that "quasi-relationship" was not the basis of its decision.229 
Instead, the Fifth Circuit "based its disqualification analysis on a duty 
to preserve confidences implied in the circumstances of a joint 
defense.,,23o This case was somewhat easier to decide because Tomko 
had expressly agreed to a duty of confidentiality; no implication of any 
duty was required. The Texas Supreme Court also cited two decisions 
from the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit-Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Kerr-McGee COrp.231 andAnalytica, 
Inc. v. NP D Research, Inc. 232 -for the proposition that disqualification can 
be based on a duty to preserve confidences even when those confidences 
are not those of a former client. Because Tomko could not personally 
represent the new plaintiff group against NME without dishonoring his 
obligations under the earlier j oint defense agreement, Tomko's disqualifi-
cation was warranted.233 
Tomko, however, never intended to represent any of the new plaintiffs. 
Only lawyers at Baker & Botts who were not involved in the earlier 





228 559 F.2d 250 (5th Cir. 1977); see text supra notes 18-65. 
229 Godbey, 924 S.W.2d at 130; see also Abraham Constr. Corp., 559 F.2d at 253. 
230 [d. 
231 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978). 
232 708 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1983). 
233 Godbey, 924 S.W.2d at 131-32. 
234 !d. at 129. 
336 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF TRIAL ADVOCACY [Vol. 22:311 
thus became whether every lawyer at Baker & Botts must be 
disqualified.235 The court first noted that ifNME had been an actual client 
of Tomko, an irrebuttable presumption of shared confidences between 
Tomko and all the lawyers at his firm would apply, thus vicariously 
disqualifying the entire firm.236 However, no attorney-client relationship 
existed between Tomko and NME. Based on the joint defense agreement, 
the court nevertheless believed that the same irrebuttable presumption 
should apply.237 This irrebuttable presumption was justified because an 
"attorney's duty to preserve confidences shared under a joint defense 
agreement is no less because the person to whom they belong was never 
a client. The attorney's promise places him in the role of a fiduciary, the 
same as toward a client.'>23S NME's motion to disqualify Baker & Botts 
was granted, although no evidence supported the disclosure of informa-
tion that Tomko received from NME to anyone at the firm.239 
Two justices dissented on the issue of Baker & Botts' disqualification 
and emphasized that Tomko had not disclosed any confidential informa-
tion from NME to any attorney at Baker & Botts.24o Moreover, thejoint 
defense agreement had expressly stated that Tomko owed no duty of 
loyalty to NME, and that Tomko had the right to take action adverse to 
NME.241 Therefore, adopting the irrebuttable presumption of shared 
confidences was inappropriate.242 
Two points are most noteworthy in this case. First, despite the express 
language of the joint defense agreement eschewing any duty of loyalty 
235 [d. at 131. 
236 [d. 
237 Id. at 132. 
238 Godbey, 924 S.W.2d at 132. 
239 !d. In regard to Cronen's motion to disqualify Baker & Botts, the Texas Supreme 
Court disagreed with the trial judge's conclusion that this case was not adverse to 
Cronen. [d. at 133. The court said that adversity must be evaluated based on "the 
likelihood of the risk and the seriousness of the consequences." [d. at 132. Even 
though the likelihood of Cronen being harmed by the new lawsuit was small, the risk 
involved was serious. [d. at 132-33. Moreover, the court believed that Cronen's 
a..-uiety that he would be added as a defendant at some point in the new litigation was 
relevant to a fmding that the new case was adverse to his interest. !d. at 133. 
24°Id. at 135 (Baker, J., dissenting). 
241 [d. at 136. 
242Id. at 137. 
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by an attorney for one member to another member ofthe agreement, the 
confidentiality provision of the joint defense agreement provided an 
adequate basis for Tomko's disqualification.243 Second, despite holding 
that no attorney-client relationship existed between Tomko and the joint 
defense members who filed the disqualification motion, an irrebuttable 
presumption of shared confidences was used to vicariously disqualify 
every lawyer at Tomko's current law frrm.244 
International Trust Corp. v. Pirtle, an unpublished opinion by the 
Texas Court of Appeals (and thus not intended to be cited as authority), 
involved ajoint defense but no writtenjoint defense agreement. 245 Again, 
the issue was whether a non-client joint defense member could seek 
disqualification of a former co-defendant' s attorney. 246 A limited partner-
ship (77-2 Ltd.) was involved in this case and the general partner was a 
corporation, Amarillo Equity Investors, Inc. (AEI), controlled by Dean 
Lively.247 In 1994, Lively and AEI deeded land owned by 77-2 Ltd. to 
International Trust Corporation (lTC), also controlled by Lively.248 
Shortly after ITC received the property from 77-2 Ltd., ITC conveyed 
it to Colonies Joint Venture ( Colonies), a j oint venture comprised ofITC 
and Anthony Saikowski.249 The limited partners of77-2 Ltd. alleged that 
the sale from 77-2 Ltd. to ITe was below fair market value, and that it 
constituted a fraudulent conveyance and a breach of fiduciary duty owed 
to them as limited partners.250 The limited partners sued lTC, AEI, 
Colonies, Lively and Saikowski.251 
On March 30, 1995, Saikowski, on his own behalf and on behalf of 
Colonies, retained the law firm of Gamer, Lovell & Stem (GL&S).252 
On April 20, 1995, Lively, who controlled ITC (the other joint venturer 
243 Godbey, 924 S.W.2d at 132. 
244 [d. 
245 1997 WL 20870 (Tex. Ct. App. Jan. 17, 1997). 
246 Pirtle, 1997 WL 20870, at ·4. 




251 Pirtle, 1997 WL 20870, at.1. 
252/d. 
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in Colonies), wrote to Saikowski reminding him that under the Colonies 
joint venture agreement, approval of both joint venturers was required 
before counsel could be retained, and that ITC was not consenting to the 
hiring of GL&S.253 On the same date, the law firm of Foster, Lewis, 
Langley, Gardner & Banack (Foster) sent a letter on behalf of ITC to 
GL&S reiterating lTC's objection to GL&S 's representation of Colonies, 
and complaining that the answer filed by GL&S on behalf ofSaikowski 
and Colonies "offered up ITC as a sacrificial lamb" in order to protect 
Saikowski.254 Shortly after sending this letter, however, Foster authorized 
GL&S to file an amended answer on behalf of Colonies-subject to prior 
approval by lTC's in-house attomey.255 In September, 1995, disputes 
arose between ITC and Saikowski over their joint venture agreement. 256 
In October 1995, GL&S wrote Lively, on behalf of Saikowski and 
Colonies, that lTC's status as a joint venturer was terminated.257 In 
February 1996, ITC made a formal demand for arbitration.258 GL&S filed 
a response and counterclaim on behalf of Saikowski and Colonies.259 
One issue presented was whether GL&S should be disqualified from 
representing Colonies and Saikowski in the arbitration proceeding. 260 ITC 
contended that disqualification was required based upon fiduciary duties 
owed to a non-client co-defendant who participated in the joint defense 
ofthe 77 -2 Ltd. limited partners' case, and because ofthe appearance of 
impropriety ifGL&S was not disqualified.261 In response to this motion, 
a contention was raised that no substantial relationship existed between 
the joint defense in the prior litigation and the subject matter of the 
arbitration and claims against Lively and AEI.262 
253 [d. at *2. 
254 [d. 
255 [d. 
256 Pirtle, 1997 WL 20870, at *3 (disputes involving, inter alia, responsibility for 





261 Pirtle, 1997 WL 20870, at *6. 
262 [d. 
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The Texas Court of Appeals first ruled that the substantial relationship 
test was not the only test that governed the decision whether to disqualify 
an attorney.263 It next held that, though no fonnal attorney-client 
relationship existed between ITC and GL&S, because ITC and GL&S 
participated in a joint defense in the original 77-2 Ltd. lawsuit, GL&S 
had a duty to preserve any confidences exchanged as part of the joint 
defense.264 Even absent an attorney-client relationship and even absent 
ajoint defense agreement, the court held that a fiduciary duty is owed to 
a non-client co-defendant who participated in a joint defense.265 
Citing Rio Hondo Implement Co. v. Euresti/66 the Pirtle court said that 
the relevant inquiry in deciding the disqualification motion before it was 
threefold: (1) was there a prior joint defense; (2) was confidential 
infonnation shared; and (3) was the matter in which the confidential 
infonnation was shared substantially related to the matter in which 
disqualification is sought. 267 Ajoint defense existed in this case. Though 
ITC never gave its written consent to the hiring of GL&S on behalf of 
the joint venture-and even objected to GL&S's representation-GL&S 
was never discharged, and ITC consented to GL&S filing an amended 
answer and seeking a settlement on lTC's behalf.268 lTC's own attorney 
also conferred with GL&S about various issues in the defense ofthe case 
brought by the limited partners.269 In regard to the requirement that 
confidential infonnation must have been disclosed by ITC to GL&S in 
order for the court to disqualify GL&S, the court stated that, "[ w ]hile our 
detennination that there was a joint defense may replace the need to 
establish an attorney-client relationship, it does not obviate the necessity 
to show that confidential infonnation was disclosed.'mo ITC then argued 
that "a party seeking disqualification is not required to establish exactly 
what confidences were shared with the attorney whose disqualification 
263 !d. 
264 Id. at *10. 
265 !d. at * II. 
266 903 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. App. 1995). 
267 Pirtle, 1997 WL 20870 at *11 (citing Rio Hondo, 903 S.W.2d at 132). 
268 !d. at * II. 
269Id. 
27°Id. at *12. 
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is sought.,,271 The court rejected this argument and found that ITe had 
not shown that it had disclosed confidential infonnation to GL&S.272 
Next, to satisfy the substantial relationship aspect ofthe disqualification 
analysis, the court stated that the party seeking disqualification "must 
prove that the facts of the previous representation are so related to the 
facts in the present litigation that a genuine threat exists that confidences 
revealed to the former counsel will be divulged to a pre~ent adversary.,,273 
In this case, no substantial relationship occurred between the two matters; 
therefore, disqualification of GL&S was denied.274 Finally, the court 
rejected the contention that the appearance of impropriety was an 
"independent ground of disqualification," although the court said it "may 
be a factor to consider in a disqualification analysis.,,275 The court gave 
no hint of what it meant by this. 
This case is noteworthy for a few reasons. Although the court could 
have easily concluded that an attorney-client relationship actually existed 
between ITC and GL&S in that ITC was a joint venturer ofGL&S' s client 
(the joint venture), the court instead emphasized the duty owed by an 
attorney to a non-client.276 Second, the court found a duty owed based 
on a joint defense-even absent ajoint defense agreement.277 Third, the 
moving party had the burden of proving that confidential information had 
been disclosed.278 Fourth, the court seemed to require not only proof of 
the exchange of confidential information, but also that the prior matter 
that involved a joint defense was substantially related to the matter in 
which disqualification was sought.279 Finally, the court rejected appear 
271 !d. at *11. 
272 Pirtle, 1997 WL 20870, at *12. 
273 [d. at * 13. 
274 !d. 
275 [d. 
276 !d. at *10. 
277 Pirtle, 1997 WL 20870, at * 11. 
278 [d. 
279 [d. at *12. The court's opinion is confusing here. At one point, the court noted 
that proof of substantial relationship replaces the need to prove exchange of confidential 
information "where the trial court is asked to disqualify an attorney because his current 
representation involves his former representation of a client on a substantially related 
matter". [d. The court continued this irrebuttable presumption of shared confidences 
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ance of impropriety as an independent basis to grant a disqualification 
motion.280 
The federal district court for New Jersey decided the most recent case 
relevant to this Article-Essex Chemical Corp. v. Hartford Accident & 
Indemnity CO. 281 In 1988, Essex Chemical Corp. (Essex) was the target 
of a hostile takeover.282 Essex retained the law finn of Skadden, Arps, 
Slate, Meagher and Flom (Skadden) to defend it in the takeover 
attempt.283 Skadden arranged for a white knight, Dow Chemical Co., to 
acquire Essex, thus defeating the hostile takeover?84 Skadden represented 
Essex in the acquisition negotiations and subsequent litigation.285 In 
1993, Essex brought suit based upon environmental claims arising from 
contamination at Essex properties, and one of the defendants was The 
Home Insurance Co., one of Essex' s insurers.286 Home Insurance retained 
Skadden in this matter. 287 In 1996, the defendants in Essex's environmen-
tal case executed a joint defense agreement to manage the litigation, 
including the coordination of discovery?88 Subsequent to this agreement, 
and during discovery, Essex filed a motion to disqualifY Skadden from 
discussion in the next paragraph, never noting in this context that it had already held 
that ITC was never a client of GL&S. /d. at * 13. Therefore, this irrebuttable presump-
tion was inapplicable. Id. at * 14. The court never directly stated that when the moving 
party never had an attorney-client relationship with the target of the disqualification 
motion that an irrebuttable presumption was not appropriate. When the court set forth 
its three part test, however, the confidential information requirement was joined to the 
substantial relationship requirement by an "and" not an "or." /d. at * 11. On the other 
hand, earlier in its opinion, the court disagreed with the position that substantial 
relationship is a "necessary element of proof on all disqualification theories except 
suing a current client." /d. at *6. 
28°Id. at *13. 
281 993 F. Supp. 241 (D. N.J. 1998), rev'g, 975 F. Supp. 650 (D. N.J. 1998) 
(magistrate's opinion); see, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Conflicts o/Interest in Legal Repre-
sentation: Should the Appearance o/Impropriety Rule Be Eliminated in NewJersey-or 
Revived Everywhere Else?, 28 SETON HALL L. REv. 315 (1997). 
282 Essex Chern., 993 F. Supp. at 243. 
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representing Home Insurance and to disqualify the attorneys for the other 
defendants who were also members ofthe joint defense agreement with 
Home Instirance.289 Skadden immediately voluntarily withdrew its 
appearance on behalf of Home Insurance; however, the attorneys for the 
other defendants opposed Essex's motion.290 
The disqualification motion was first ruled upon by a magistrate who, 
without holding a hearing, disqualified attorneys for all the defendants 
who were members of the joint defense agreement. 291 The magistrate first 
found that "Skadden's participation in the joint defense group created a 
risk that the confidential information acquired by Skadden during the 
former representation may be used to the detriment of Essex.,,292 The 
magistrate then applied an irrebuttable presumption that Skadden had 
shared this confidential information with the other members ofthe Joint 
Defense Agreement. 293 Defense counsels' certifications that no confiden-
tial information had been shared were irrelevant. 294 The magistrate further 
reasoned that "defendants' participation in the Joint Defense Agreement, 
together with Skadden's former representation of Essex, gave rise to an 
implied attorney-client relationship between Essex and all defense 
counsel.,,295 Based upon this implied attorney-client relationship, another 
irrebuttable presumption of shared confidences applied to all defense 
counsel. 296 The magistrate also found that disqualification ofthe attorneys 
for all the members ofthe j oint defense agreement was appropriate under 
New Jersey's Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9(b), which prohibits 
conduct that creates an "appearance ofimpropriety.,,297 
A federal district court judge reviewed the disqualification motion and 
strongly disagreed with the magistrate?98 The judge noted that "[t]he 
289 !d. 
290 [d. at 241. 
291 !d. at 244-45. 
292 Essex Chern., 993 F. Supp. at 244. 
293 [d. at 244-45. 
294 [d. at 245. 
295 [d. (emphasis added). 
296 [d. 
297 Essex Chern., 993 F. Supp. at 244-45. 
298 [d. at 245-55. 
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parties have not cited, and the Court's research has not yielded, any 
controlling or even persuasive authority directly on point.,,299 The federal 
district judge then ruled that an irrebuttable presumption of shared 
confidences amongjoint defense lawyers should not be applied.3°O Only 
if Skadden had actually disclosed confidential information to the other 
joint defense members would disqualification of all defendants' attorneys 
be required.301 Because the magistrate did not hold a hearing, a remand 
was necessary on the issue regarding whether actual disclosure had 
occurred.302 Additionally, the district judge ruled that the magistrate erred 
in implying an attorney-client relationship between Essex and counsel 
for all the members ofthe joint defense groUp.303 In this case, an implied 
attorney-client relationship was "contrary to law and unsupported by the 
record. ,,304 Because the record did not contain the joint defense agree-
ment, one could not refer to the factors relevant to an implied attor-
ney-client relationship, such as the "defendants' and counsel's intent, 
[and] the extent and nature of counsels' interaction.,,305 Nor did any case 
support the proposition that a "collaborative counsel relationship renders 
a participating attorney implied counsel for the former client of a 
collaborating attorney. ,,306 
III. Issues to Be Addressed by the Courts 
This Article has set forth the analysis of cases that have attempted to 
resolve the issues relevant to the disqualification of attorneys involved 
299 !d. at 246. 
300 !d. at 25t. 
301 [d. at 251-52. 
302 Essex Chern., 993 F. Supp. at 252. A remand was also necessary on the appear-
ance of impropriety issue because the magistrate had not considered the relevant facts, 
and had incorrectly relied upon a presumption of shared confidences in concluding that 
an ordinary citizen would fmd an appearance of impropriety in defense counsels' of 
the other joint defense members continuing to represent Essex's claim. [d. at 254. 
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injoint defense agreements. Unfortunately, the opinions are not always 
easily understood. However, one point is clear, no generally accepted 
analysis ofthis disqualification issue has occurred. The remainder ofthis 
Article attempts to develop a coherent approach based on the recurring 
issues that have been addressed in these past cases. 
A threshold issue is whether an attorney for one member of the joint 
defense effort owes any duty to another member ofthe j oint defense who 
has not shared an express attorney-client relationship. Courts have 
recognized some duty based either on an implied attorney-client relation-
ship theory or upon a duty arising out of the joint defense. The better 
approach to this issue is to eschew an analysis that relies on creating an 
attorney-relationship in favor of recognizing that any duty owed by an 
attorney for one joint defense member to another joint defense member 
springs independently from the attorney's participation in the joint 
defense. The reason for this conclusion is that the implied attorney-client 
relationship model is based on a misunderstanding of the relationship 
between members of a joint defense and their attorneys. One rationale 
for the implied attorney-client relationship approach is the analogy 
between joint defense members and multiple clients of one lawyer. 
However, this analogy is faulty.307 Joint defense defendants do not share 
the "unity of interest" that multiple clients of one lawyer share.308 
Separate attorneys are often retained by joint defense members to "avoid 
the pitfalls of multiple representation. ,,309 Also, one should not analogize 
. joint defense members to trade association members. Trade association 
members communicate directly to the trade association's attorneys. Joint 
defense members usually do not communicate directly with attorneys for 
other joint defense members.310 Moreover, the degree of unity of interest 
among joint defense members is different than among trade association 
members.311 The "legal fate" of one joint defense member "has no 
?07 See Rushing, supra note 2, at 1273; Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 
602 (8th Cir. 1977). 
308 Bartel, supra note 4, at 876. 
309 Forsgren, supra note 16, at 1219. 
310 See generally Bartel, supra note 4, at 875-918. 
311 [d. at 876-79. 
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necessary impact upon any other co-defendant," unlike the trade associa-
tion situation.312 
Unlike multiple clients and trade association members, joint defense 
members do not share a relationship of trust; rather the joint defense 
agreement is often required from a relationship of mistrust and lack of 
confidence. Moreover, the expectations of each member of the joint 
defense agreement differ from that of multiple clients or trade association 
members. Joint defense members, for example, fully expect that they may 
be cross-examined by attorneys representing other joint members.313 
Importantly, j oint defense members realistically expect loyalty only from 
their own lawyer, not from the attorneys ofotherjointmembers.314 Joint 
defense members therefore should not be considered the clients of other 
j oint defense members' attorneys. In this regard, one commentator stated 
that those courts that have held that joint defense members do have an 
attorney-client relationship with other members' attorneys are "engaged 
more in hyperbole than in thoughtful analysis.,,31S Because the duty owed 
by an attorney in a joint defense situation is a duty based on the joint 
defense itself, the proper threshold issue, therefore, is not whether the 
record establishes that an attorney-client relationship existed by implica-
tion but whether a joint defense has been proven between the party 
seeking disqualification and the former client ofthe attorney who is the 
target of the disqualification motion. 
Because the attorney's duty is defined based on participation in a joint 
defense, and not dependent on any attorney-client relationship, consent 
by the attorney's actual former client becomes irrelevant to a disqualifica-
tion motion filed by a non-client, former, co-joint defense member. This 
position avoids the need to resolve another ethical issue-the propriety of 
a new client who is asked to forego suit against a former client ofthe new 
client's attorney (when the former client was part of an earlier joint 
312Id. at 878. 
313 See generally Forsgren, supra note 16, at 1251 n.134. 
314 See generally Bartel, supra note 4, at 878. 
315Id. at 901; see, e.g., Ageloffv. Noranda, Inc., 936 F. Supp. 72 (D. R.I. 1996) 
(ruling that an attorney-client relationship would not be implied because the dispute 
was between members of the joint defense agreement, but that an attorney-client 
relationship would be implied if a third party's rights were involved). 
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defense) as bartered to obtain the fonner client's consentto the attorney's 
new representation.316 
Once the relevant threshold issue is accepted to be whether a joint 
defense existed, the next issue is what needs to be proven to establish a 
joint defense that could fonn the basis of the disqualification motion. 
Often joint defense members draft written joint defense agreements 
setting forth the rights and obligations of the members and their 
attorneys.3\7 If these agreements include clauses that provide that all 
infonnation shared among the members and their attorneys relating to 
the joint defense can be used only for purposes ofthe joint defense, and 
that no attorney can use any infonnation obtained pursuant to the joint 
defense agreement on behalf of any client other than the joint defense 
member client, clearly a duty has been imposed upon the attorney, which 
will inure to the benefit of all joint defense members. In such a situation, 
an attorney could be properly disqualified in a subsequent case based on 
a motion filed by a joint defense member different than that attorney's 
client. 
More problematic is when no express joint defense agreement exists 
regarding confidentiality and subsequent use of joint defense 
infonnation.318 This author suggests that it should be more difficult for 
a disqualification motion to be granted when the motion is filed by a joint 
defense member against the attorney for another defense member if no 
express joint defense agreement occurred. 
The next issues to be resolved involve matters regarding burden of 
proof and presumption of shared confidences. When a fonner client is 
seeking disqualification of its attorney in a substantially related matter, 
no need arises for the fonner client to prove that confidential infonnation 
was actually given to the attorney. Nor is the attorney, who is the target 
of the disqualification motion, allowed to defend by proving that 
confidential infonnation was not disclosed. Regarding the fonner client, 
substantially related matter situation, there is an irrebuttable presumption 
316 See, e.g, Turner v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 896 F. Supp. 651 (E.D. Tex. 
1995). 
317 See, e.g. ,joint defense agreement, supra note 123; GTE N., Inc. v. Apache Prods. 
Co., 914 F. Supp. 1575, 1577-78 (N.D. Ill. 1996). 
318 See, e.g., International Trust Corp. v. Pirtle, 1997 WL 20870 (Tex. Ct. App. Jan. 
17,1997). 
1998] JOINT DEFENSE AGREEMENTS 347 
that confidential information was disclosed. Such an irrebuttable 
presumption should be rejected in the situation where a member of a joint 
defense is seeking disqualification of another member's attorney in a 
subsequent matter. No attorney-client relationship exists between the 
party moving for disqualification and the target attorney. Nor does the 
attorney owe any duty of loyalty to this member of the former joint 
defense. The duty imposed by a joint defense arises solely out of the 
possession of confidential information. Moreover, because joint defense 
members are not as forthcoming wi th information for other j oint defense 
members as they would be with their own attorneys, an irrebuttable 
presumption does not appear to be appropriate. 
The next issue thus becomes whether a rebuttable presumption of 
disclosed confidential information is appropriate. Ifthis is true, the party 
moving for disqualification would meet its burden by proving merely that 
a joint defense (and perhaps a j oint defense agreement) existed. To avoid 
disqualification, the attorney subject to the disqualification motion would 
then have the burden of proving that he had not received confidential 
information from the moving party. An alternate approach would be to 
put the burden on the moving party not only to prove the existence of a 
joint defense or joint defense agreement, but also to prove that it had 
given confidential information to the attorney it is now seeking to 
disqualify. Under this alternate approach, ifthe moving party met these 
two burdens, the attorney, to avoid disqualification, would then need to 
convince the fact finder that he had not received confidential informa-
tion.319 
In deciding whether the "rebuttable presumption" approach or the 
"burden on the moving party" approach is more desirable, this author 
submits it is relevant whether an express joint defense agreement with 
a confidentiality provision exists. If an express agreement exists, the 
rebuttable presumption approach should be used. On the other hand, if 
no express joint defense agreement exists (only a joint defense among 
joint defendants), the burden should be placed on the moving party to 
prove that confidential information was given to the attorney whose 
disqualification is now being sought. 
The next issue in deciding whether the disqualification motion should 
be granted is whether the confidential information that was disclosed as 
319 Under either alternative, in-camera presentation would be appropriate. 
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part of the joint defense or joint defense agreement should be substantially 
related to the subsequent action in which disqualification is sought. This 
author submits that the answer to this question should be yes. The 
accepted law today is that an attorney will only be disqualified in a 
subsequent action based on a motion by an actual former client if the 
subsequent action is substantially related to the attorney's prior represen-
tation ofthat client. Considering that joint defense members do not have 
an attorney-client relationship with other joint defense members, the 
requisite proof for a disqualification motion brought by a non-client joint 
defense member should be at least as burdensome as required when a 
former client files such a motion. Moreover, a substantial relationship 
requirement avoids the situation where an attorney is locked into being 
either a plaintiffs or defendant's lawyer. For example, assume that 
Attorney A represented Defendant A in an asbestos personal injury matter 
brought by Plaintiff X against ten asbestos manufacturers, and that a joint 
defense agreement was entered into among all the defendants. Under this 
author's proposal, in subsequent years, Attorney A would be disqualified 
from representing PlaintiffY in an action against any member of earlier 
joint defense agreement only if the cases were substantially related. 
Absent a substantial relationship requirement, Attorney A, having 
defended one asbestos defendant, which was part of a joint defense 
agreement, would be precluded forever from representing any plaintiff 
against any asbestos defendant (assuming some confidential information 
had been disclosed as part of the joint defense). 
Assuming that the former j oint defense member's motion to disqualify 
the attorney of its former joint defense member is granted, the next issue 
involves the disqualification of other members of the disqualified 
attorney's law firm. The current majority position is that when an 
individual attorney is disqualified based on a motion by a current or 
former client, an irrebuttable presumption exists that the attorney whose 
earlier representation led to his individual disqualification shared 
confidential information with the other attorneys in his law firm, and thus 
every attorney at the law firm is disqualified. A minority position creates 
a rebuttable presumption of shared confidences, and thus permits the other 
law firm members to avoid disqualification if the firm members can prove 
that confidential information was not shared. This author's conclusion 
is that in the joint defense situation where a motion to disqualify is being 
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filed by a non-client, an irrebuttable presumption of shared confidences 
with other members ofthe law firm is not appropriate. The closer issue 
is whether even a rebuttable presumption is appropriate that would require 
the law firm to prove adequate screening mechanisms and that confiden-
tial information had not been disclosed from the tainted lawyer to others, 
or whether the burden should be placed on the moving party to prove that 
confidential information had been disclosed. Because the duty owed to 
a non-client member of a joint defense should not be equated to the duty 
owed to a former client, the better approach would be to require the 
non-client moving party who seeks to disqualify all members of a law 
firm to havethe burden of establishing that confidential information had 
been disclosed to members ofthe law firm. A similar analysis should be 
applied when the motion seeks disqualification of counsel for all members 
of a subsequent joint defense such as the situation in Essex Chemical 
Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. 320 
As a final point, the appearance of impropriety standard should not 
be used to evaluate disqualification motions filed by non-client former 
joint defense members. Appearance of impropriety is too vague to 
provide a meaningful standard. To the extent it has been defined with 
reference to the public's perspective of the impropriety ofthe situation,32\ 
it overlooks the complexities involved in defining a lawyer's duty to a 
non-client, and the obligations among joint defense members and their 
attorneys. 
IV. Conclusion 
In recent years, courts have struggled when ruling on motions seeking 
to disqualify an attorney that are filed not by that attorney's former client, 
but by the attorney's former client's former joint defense members. The 
courts have not accepted a single approach to decide this issue. This 
author, after reviewing and analyzing the cases on this issue, proposes 
an analysis that incorporates the issues and concerns discussed by the 
32°993 F. Supp. 241 (D. N.1. 1998), rev'g975 F. Supp. 650 (D. N.J. 1998)(magis-
trate's opinion). 
321 See, e.g., Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602,609 (8th Cir. 1977); 
Green, supra note 281, at 315. 
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cases. Hopefully, the analysis will simplify the resolution of the issue 
in future cases, and will help litigants and attorneys better evaluate the 
benefits and risks of involvement in joint defenses. 
